Noesis 76 - December 1992

Chris Langan to Ron Hoeflin

AN OPEN RESPONSE TO RON HOEFLIN

Dear Ron: Having read your letters in Noesis 73, I find myself in an uncomfortable position. I feel almost guilty for what I'm about to write. I don't admire those who take candy from babies, and you make it just that easy for me to do what I must do here. Please believe me when I say that I regret having to defend the CTMU at the expense of your scholarly reputation. Had you not put yourself in the path of a juggernaut, I would stay my pen. But you have, and so I cannot. If it is any solace, you can salvage your reputation by admitting your mistakes before you compound them.

There are two kinds of argument which reliably indicate weakness on the parts of those who lean on them, particularly in the total absence of direct justification. One is an argument from authority and the other is an ad hominem argument. Your first letter relies on them exclusively. This is not surprising; after your trademark disclaimer ("I've only read (some ridiculously small) part of Langan's (incredibly long and boring) essay..."), you couldn't possibly have anything more substantial to say. I have never seen anyone telegraph the weakness of his position more clearly than by your opening sentence, in which you unabashedly admit that you haven't even read what you propose to "rebut". I don't pretend to know what overcomes you when you do things like this. But whatever it is, I urge you to control it for all our sakes.

To your eventual credit, you finally do get around to reading "almost all of" my paper before your next letter. I'll respond to the remarks in both of your letters in the order they appeared.

1. Dogmatism is a term generally applied to opinions or unwarranted premises. It does not apply to considered arguments for which a definite logical or mathematical structure has been carefully given. And Pepper's statement that "any claim to certainty is dogmatic" cannot be used against the CTMU. I.e., if there is no true claim to certainty, then either the statement is itself uncertain and unusable, or it is "self-exceptional"...in which case the CTMU, which internalizes uncertainty by distributing it over its own components, is entitled to the same self-exemption. As cases in point, the theories of undecidability and incomputability are respectively decidable and computable, and the theory of probability (partial nondeterminacy) is itself deterministic.

One of your more obvious shortcomings as a philosopher is what appears to be a limited grasp of modern logic. Even though you are far from alone in this regard among self-styled metaphysicians, it is a damnable flaw. The distinction between certainty and uncertainty is plainly a cornerstone of the CTMU. Do you really think that I'd claim certainty for the CTMU on any level without being able to justify it minutely? Please, read my letter to Rick.

2. Those who live in self-constructed houses of glass should never throw stones (like "pompously dictatorial") etched with their personal monograms. Need I say more?

3. On your analogy between metaphysics and geometric coordinate systems: a correct metaphysical theory is by necessity universal, tautological, and unique up to isomorphism for any cognitive class. Coordinate systems, on the other hand, are not unique; they vary (e.g.) with spatial curvature and observational vantage. So your analogy, and all it implies, is invalid. The same applies to specific algorithms for computing pi. When I introduced the geometric metaphor to Noesis on page 2, issue 46, it was not as a metaphysical root concept. If you want to maintain credibility for the analogies in your tests, you must take care to use analogy correctly in practice.

According to Jojo Einstein and his buddy Immanuel Kant, the human logicomathematical syntax (HLMS) is "standardized". Because any human theory of metaphysics must be consistent with this syntax, we are severely constrained in our construction of metaphysical theories. In fact, we may ultimately construct just one: the CTMU, which is defined on the HLMS. Just as coordinate systems vary within HLMS-ordered reality, variations among what you persistently refer to as "metaphysical theories" correspond to different perspectives within the CTMU. They are partial; only the CTMU is "complete". As I took pains to demonstrate in Noesis 71, your use of the term metaphysics to describe these variations is viciously inconsistent (e.g., see paragraph 3, page 2 of my paper).

4. You write: "Pepper says that he does not regard his choice of purpose as a root metaphor as the claim that the entire universe is purposeful (or is intelligent)." You can't rationalize Pepper's position merely by implying that he understood its inadequacies, especially when such an understanding should have enabled him to resolve them. Since the CTMU succeeds where you and Pepper failed, one would think that the two of you would be falling all over each other in gratitude for my rescue of the purposive act as any kind of metaphysical metaphor. Don't you want to see Pepper's emphasis on purpose metaphysically vindicated, even if it can only be done by one whose command of logic and mathematics surpasses your own?

5. You say you "finally waded through nearly all of Langan's essay in issue 71". This issue detailed the relationship between purpose and quantum theory with unprecedented precision. So when you ostentatiously present an analogy by which purpose "may indeed throw light on" quantum theory, you are merely embellishing another point previously made by me. Why do you routinely follow blanket condemnations of my papers with self-justificative statements that seem to have been lifted directly from their pages?

Ron, you simply have to stop this nonsense. I value your contributions to the journal, and I do want to cooperate with you. But I can't as long as you insist on sabotaging my every attempt. Attacking the sanity and intelligence of those who disagree with you helps no one; the world is harsh enough without gratuitous enmity. If the most intelligent among us cannot cooperate, then what hope have the rest?

I've been methodically trying to put this organization on the map since I joined it, and not only for myself. We're all part of the same endeavor, and if just one of us succeeds brilliantly, the rest of us benefit by inspiration and association. Wouldn't you rather be part of a universally respected agency of human progress than an obstacle unto yourself? If you are rational - and I truly hope that you are - your answer must be yes. Chris Langan

The Mega Society


Copyright (c) 1992 by the Mega Society. All rights reserved. Copyright for each individual contribution is retained by the author unless otherwise indicated.